CIA releases pre-9/11 presidential briefs on bin Laden threat

The CIA has declassified more than 100 pages of presidential intelligence briefings showing that analysts repeatedly warned Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush that Osama bin Laden wanted to strike the United States years before the Sept. 11 attacks.

The documents, released Friday on the 25th anniversary of the attacks, cover the period from February 1998 to Sept. 12, 2001. They include dozens of formerly top-secret daily briefings prepared by the CIA and other intelligence agencies for the White House.

CIA Director John Ratcliffe called the release “the single largest release of CIA analysis related to 9/11 ever” and described it as “an act of exceptional transparency.” In a post on X, he said, “Americans can now see for themselves the intelligence leading up to this tragic day for our Nation.”

The briefings show a steady flow of alarming but often imprecise intelligence about bin Laden, al-Qaida and possible attacks on U.S. targets at home and abroad. Many pages remain heavily redacted, and the documents do not appear to contain major new revelations about the attacks or the government’s understanding of them.

One September 1998 briefing came close to describing the kind of attack that would occur three years later. It said bin Laden’s “preferred option is to strike the US on its own soil in Washington” and that al-Qaida “may fly an explosive-packed airplane into a US city.” The same memo cautioned that “intelligence provides no conclusive information on bin Ladin’s intentions for future attacks.”

That warning came weeks after al-Qaida supporters bombed U.S. embassies in East Africa and after the Clinton administration’s failed attempt to kill bin Laden with Tomahawk missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan. A briefing eight days after the Aug. 20, 1998, strikes concluded that bin Laden and other terrorist leaders in Afghanistan had survived and that their communications network remained intact.

Other briefings described militants training to hijack commercial airliners, conducting dry runs to test U.S. airport security, experimenting with chemical, biological or other unconventional weapons, seeking materials for “dirty bombs,” plotting hostage-taking and using narcotics trafficking to finance terrorism plans. A December 1998 document said conspirators “had evaded security checks during a recent trial run at an unidentified New York airport” and that “some members of the Bin Ladin network have received hijack training.”

The records also show concern that the Taliban, which hosted bin Laden in Afghanistan, was unlikely to surrender him. An April 1998 document said Taliban officials viewed him as a “guest” and were reluctant to control his activities because of “gratitude for his assistance during the Soviet occupation.” A March 2001 memo said the “Taliban is not likely to give up bin Ladin for less than full diplomatic recognition and significant reconstruction aid.”

By Aug. 6, 2001, intelligence officials delivered a briefing to Bush titled “bin Ladin determined to strike in US.” It said “clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US.” The Guardian reported that the briefing also cited “suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks” and said the FBI was conducting about 70 full field investigations in the United States that it considered bin Laden-related.

A Sept. 12, 2001, report included in the release said a source indicated the attacks had been planned for two years and had also targeted the U.S. Capitol, according to The Guardian.

The document release came as 9/11 widow Terry Strada urged President Donald Trump to hold Saudi Arabia accountable for the attacks. Speaking at a remembrance ceremony attended in lower Manhattan by Vice President JD Vance, Strada said, “Tell the Saudis to stop lying.” Fifteen of the hijackers were Saudi nationals. Strada is part of a coalition of 9/11 families suing the Saudi government, which denies complicity and is fighting the lawsuit.

The 9/11 Commission concluded in 2004 that poor communication between the FBI and CIA, failures to “connect the dots” and a “failure of imagination” helped allow the attacks. Its recommendations led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center.